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10.1  Introduction 
 Networks matter. Whether a personal social network of contacts we use to navigate 
our daily lives, to globalized communication networks that connect governments, 
commerce, and social movements around the planet, networks are omnipresent. 
Social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter have revolutionized how we 
network, as well as expanded the scale and sped up the time frame that we can now 
network on. 
 Social network analysis (SNA) examines the relationships among actors and 
ideas within social group. A relationship is any kind of transfer, from coercion and 
money to social approval and ideas, among people or groups of any size or level of 
organization. The vast and diverse network of transfers is central to reproduction of 
and change in social patterns and behavior, including how society relates to its 
ecological environment (Prell  2012 ). SNA is eminently applicable to studying the 
relations between society and the environment (Bodin and Prell  2011 ). SNA is inter-
disciplinary in the sense that it can be used to trace the fl ow of scientifi c and other 
ideas into the realm of discourse within society. From there, this fl ow of ideas can 
be followed to its impact upon political action and its outcomes. At the same time, 
it can be applied to different levels of society, from the micro inter-personal dynamics 
to the macro-global scale fl ow of new norms and alliances. SNA can also be used to 
isolate different dimensions of society, such as the composition of the discourse 
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fi eld around a phenomenon, as well as the network of cooperation or information 
transfer among social actors. These fl ows and dimensions include the crucial 
feedback loops of grasping and framing a natural phenomenon wherein knowledge 
and belief, correct or not, are born and take life. Although providing the crucial 
substrate to social potential, molecular or genetic components cannot predict the 
formations and fl ow of society. SNA is inter-disciplinary, then, in the sense that it 
allows us to draw in the concepts and ideas about the natural and human worlds at 
all levels, and study how they work within the social and cultural arenas of collective 
human action. 
 Social scientists have taken note of the role that networks and networking play in 
social and political change, from improving safety conditions in nuclear power 
plants to negotiating new legislation on the supra-national level within the European 
Union. SNA has been used to analyze the discursive dimensions around political 
processes as well as coalition formation among organizations around environmental 
activism. The effectiveness of political or social movements is often determined 
by the nature of linkages between actors within a social network. Social network 
analysis can be used to examine political mobilization and the formation of advo-
cacy coalitions as well as the spread of scientifi c knowledge and the dissemination 
of social or behavioral norms. By representing scientifi c knowledge as an information 
network along with other types of networks, a network approach can integrate the 
perspectives of different sciences (consilience) to study their conjoint and interactive 
effect upon the process of climate change production and solution. 
 And nowhere is the interaction between human society and the environment on 
a greater scale than in how our behaviors affect that greatest of global commons: 
the Earth’s atmosphere. Increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
in the Earth’s atmosphere from human industry have begun to change the planet’s 
climate regime. And with the change in climate, have come changes to earth 
systems that humanity is dependent on. Sea levels are rising, threatening coastal 
communities; ice sheets have begun to melt, threatening fresh water supply; crops 
in some areas have begun to fail, threatening food supply. While human beings are 
adaptable, our capacity to do so will likely be overwhelmed as the scale of these 
impacts increase (IPCC  2007a ). In order to reduce the emission of GHGs that spur 
climate change, norms of collective responsibility will need to be disseminated on a 
global scale (Broadbent  2010 ). But how will this happen? Indeed,  can it happen? 
 When ozone depletion was operationalized as a problem within the 1980s, the 
driving force (production of chlorofl uorocarbons or CFCs) was linked to a few 
specifi c activities (use of aerosol cans, use of specifi c refrigerants, use of certain 
packing materials) within a few economic sectors. The industries were able to 
substitute less harmful chemicals at low cost, and consumers did not have to radically 
change their behavior. Operationalizing climate change as a scientifi c certainty, 
let alone a problem, has been such a contentious debate because of the irreducible 
complexity of the issue. Greenhouse gases, which drive climate change, are not 
just produced by a few components of a few choice industries. Rather, they are 
omnipresent in virtually all economic activity and embedded within the production 
and maintenance of much of the globe’s infrastructure. They are diverse in their 
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source and type, creating debates over responsibility for their emission, as each 
greenhouse gas has its own global warming potential (GWP). Although carbon 
dioxide from industry and transport is the most abundantly produced anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas, methane emissions from agriculture cause more heat to be trapped 
within the atmosphere. To comprehensively tackle climate change as a problem, 
emissions from virtually every sector of the globalized economy must be addressed, 
not just a few choice “demon chemicals” from specialized sectors. Furthermore, 
because different societies around the globe have such varying sources of GHG 
emissions, national approaches to mitigation will have to be diverse rather than 
uniform. Mol ( 2001 ) has illustrated widespread norms and values in regards to the 
environment have diffused across the world, which seek to minimize the harm 
economic processes cause to the planet’s ecosystems. However, this will take time 
to diffuse across different societies due to the scope and variety of climate change’s 
drivers and impacts. 
 In the past, social scientists have studied how norms and values have been codifi ed 
in international treaties on environmental issues (such as the Montreal Protocol) 
and how the design of these treaties have helped internalize environmental norms and 
values in societies around the globe (Schneider et al.  2002 ; Helm  2005 ; Speth and 
Haas  2006 ; Young  2002 ). However, constructs of environmental values or behavioral 
norms have been haphazard in regards to the threat of climate change, even with the 
drafting and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. While some nations have 
made great progress in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, others have not. 
Societies have varied greatly in their responses to climate change, and attention is now 
focused on what characteristics within societies are responsible for this variation. 
(Evans et al.  1993 ; Jacobson and Weiss  1998 ; Schreurs  2002 , p. 261; Weidner and 
Janicke  2002 , pp. 430–431) What factors have led to such varying norms and 
responses to climate change in societies around the world when global norms on 
policies around ozone depletion, ocean dumping, and pesticide use were embraced? 
 The authors of this chapter are part of a group of researchers, the Compon 
project, who propose that the next step in investigating these variables is to examine 
comparative policy networks in order to test hypotheses about social factors helping 
or hindering domestic responses to climate change. The project on Comparing 
Climate Change Policy Networks (Compon) project tests the effect of social 
organization, cultural meaning and political mobilization on a nation’s response to 
climate change. The Compon project is a collaborative effort among teams of 
scholars using social network analysis to compare and contrast discourse and action 
around climate change and climate change policy within 19 societies around the 
globe. The societies currently within the study include Brazil, Canada, China, 
Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, 
South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Vietnam, and the 
United States. Using data collected by academic teams using the same instruments 
in these societies, social network analysis allows researchers to identify and 
compare patterns of belief, advocacy coalitions, mobilization and policy-formation 
as they shape the formation of mitigation policies and behaviors (Broadbent  2010 ; 
Broadbent  2013 , #3577). 
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10.2  Structure, Function and Power in Social Networks 
 Network analysis concerns itself with the study of relationships among actors within 
a given network. New types of SNA approaches are incorporating not only actors, 
but also ideas or discourse, in the measured networks. One body of theory calls 
these ideas “actants,” to distinguish them from willfully self-propelled “actors” 
(Latour  2005 ). The formal approach of Integrated Structurational Analysis (ISA) 
has been proposed to integrate the various dimensions in societal processes as 
network vectors among the units (actors and actants) (Broadbent  1998 ,  2003 ). 
The present section will discuss the approach and measures developed for social 
networks that can be applied to this kind of integrative synthesis and analysis. 
The essay will then distinguish social action and discourse networks and examine 
their interaction. 
 Depending on how the term ‘actor’ is operationalized, actors within social 
networks can be individuals (micro-level social networks), groups or organizations 
(meso-level social networks), or states in global relationships (macro-networks). 
To examine the networks that underlie and produce national-level policy formation, 
it is often appropriate to use organizations as the actor or social unit of analysis, as 
done here. The relationships between actors in a social network are described 
as  ties , and represent a point of social contact between actors within the system. 
The social contact can consist of any type of interaction, be it the sharing of infor-
mation or ideologies, the dissemination of a norm, or the exchange of support or 
resources. Much social scientifi c research, as is typical of survey research, has been 
conducted on samples of individualized actors. SNA differs because it also collects 
information on the relations or ties among the actors. If we want to study the ties 
as constituting a whole system, we have to study the group of actors that could 
potentially have direct ties among themselves. That rules out the random selection 
of actors from a large population (though one can study “ego-centric” networks that 
way). Rather, to study systems of relationships, we have to study the patterns of ties 
among a set of actors susceptible to relationships. 
 This kind of whole network study is applied to some kind of community, such as 
a classroom, a town, or in this case, a “policy domain.” A policy domain refers to all 
the actors potentially infl uential upon a certain type of policy within a nation-state 
(or governmental area). The SNA approach takes into account both the qualities of 
the actors themselves, both their resources and their ideas, and the vital relationships 
that transfer those qualities as sanctions among the actors. The relational theory 
underlying the SNA approach argues that societal power is relational in that it 
involves the connection and mobilizations of numbers of actors and ideas. Hence, 
the relational ties are fundamental because they reveal the active fl ow of ideas and 
resources among actors that enable the power to affect policies and large scale 
societal changes. 
 One of the primary structural concerns within social network analysis (SNA) is 
identifying the “most important” or “most prominent” actors within a given social 
network (Wasserman and Faust  1997 ). The concept of actor  importance is a measure 
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of the property of actor  location within a social network, with the most  important 
actors being located in the most  strategic locations within the network. Thus, an 
actor’s role is characterized by its structural position within the network 
(Borgatti and Foster  2003 ). Actor centrality is the measure typically employed 
for quantifying an actor’s role within a social network. A central actor is an actor 
with many ties to other actors within a network. 
 Bodin et al. ( 2006 ) note that a network actor with a high degree of centrality can 
effectively coordinate actors within the network during times of change. Burt ( 2003 ) 
characterizes these actors as “brokers” within social networks. In social networks the 
policy sphere, this means policies can be passed through a legislature more quickly, 
but Abrahamson and Rosenkopf ( 1997 ) contend this leads to centralized decision 
making within the network. Another implication is that actors within the network 
will have more limited access to other sources of information (Weimann  1982 ). 
 Another key structural feature of social networks is density within the network. 
Density within SNA is a quantifi able measure of connectivity between actors within 
the network and of the connectivity of the network as a whole. Density is not used 
as a measure of centrality per se; rather, it is a measure of the network’s cohesion – 
the number of links between actors within the whole network, not on an individual 
basis as with centrality (Wasserman and Faust  1997 ). Density of a network is calcu-
lated by dividing the number of links by the number of nodes within the network. 
One of the structural characteristics of dense social networks is a buffering capacity 
referred to as redundancy (Bodin et al.  2006 ). In dense networks, if an actor is 
removed from the network, because of the many links between other actors within 
the network, the loss does not have as profound an effect on the overall network 
structure. For advocacy coalitions, this means even if a central actors is removed 
from the coalition, other actors can step into the position and assume the functions 
of the central actor (Folke et al.  2005 ). 
 Social networks with greater connectivity of knowing each other exhibit higher 
levels of trust among actors within the network (Granovetter  1985 ). Pretty and 
Ward ( 2001 ) theorize that greater network density increases the possibility of social 
control of the actors within the network, which facilitates top-down regulation of 
the environment by the state. Oh et al. ( 2004 ) caution that dense networks can 
streamline policy processes, but may also promote homogenization of both experi-
ence and knowledge. Moreover,  Frank and Yasumoto ( 1998 ) caution that too many 
links between actors within a social network can lock certain actors into infl exible 
positions, making political change diffi cult. 
 A concluding example of a structural feature of social networks is modularity or 
betweenness. Betweenness can be measured within a social network by quantifying 
the distance between nodes within a network. In any given social network, groups 
with high internal density may be loosely connected to other groups with high inter-
nal density. This phenomenon is termed modularity, and describes groupings of 
actors within a social network (Bodin et al.  2006 ). Within a civil society, this can be 
characterized by businesses having dense ties to one another, but weak or peripheral 
ties to government ministries or environmental NGOs. The betweenness of actors 
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within a social network is a measurement of diameter – it is the number of steps 
needed to reach from one node to another within then network. 
 A high degree of betweenness in social networks allows different blocks of 
actors to interpret knowledge and develop policy responses distinct from one 
another. This is often the case in social networks around ecological governance, 
with different blocks developing different interpretations of data about the environment 
(Ghimire et al.  2004 ). The more modular a social network is, the less trust is 
demonstrated between different blocks within the network (Borgatti and Foster  2003 ). 
Likewise, it is more diffi cult to transfer tacit and/or complex knowledge (“externalize” 
scientifi c knowledge) within social networks with a high degree of betweenness 
(Reagans and McEvily  2003 ). In turn, advocacy coalitions characterized by high 
modularity within the network are prone to fragment, as the removal of a single 
actor can disengage a block of actors from the rest of the network (Borgatti and 
Foster  2003 ). 
 SNA sometimes assumes that higher centrality gives an actor more power over 
the other actors, and hence over the behavior of the whole network. However, this 
assumption is greatly in need of empirical testing in actual policy systems. 
The policy network approach taken by the Compon project includes measures of 
actor power in the formation of policy. One measure is created by survey respondents 
checking off those actors in the list they think to be very powerful within the 
policy domain (in this case, climate change). This is a reputational measure of 
power. Another measure involves the actor scoring their degree of satisfaction 
with the outcome of a policy debate in which they were involved. The higher the 
satisfaction, the measure assumes, the greater the effective behavioral power of 
the actor. These power measures can be used to trace the relative infl uence of 
different actors, their coalitions, and their ideas and ideologies – in this case about 
climate change. These measures were developed in earlier policy network studies 
(Knoke et al.  1996 ). 
10.3  Action Networks and Discourse Networks 
 How different societies around the world respond to the call for mitigation of their 
emissions associated with climate change is a complex process involving a number 
of different interacting factors. The relevant factors can be broadly modeled as two 
different types of networks –  discourse networks and  action networks . Both types of 
networks have their own systemic dynamics and properties. Since both types of 
network are social phenomena, they are therefore more than the sum of the individual 
ideas and individual actions between actors in the fi eld or domain. Social network 
analysis can be used to analyze the whole topography or morphology of these 
multi-actor, multi-idea fi elds. 
 The Compon project uses both types of networks to examine the social and 
political dynamics of mitigation policy formation and outcome in a number of 
societies. Use of the Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) software enables the 
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examination of the discourse around climate change issues and policies within a 
society’s media and/or legislative records. Pioneered by Philip Leifeld, DNA applies 
the methods of SNA to study the actors quoted in newspapers and the policy 
positions they advocate. When analyzed by network analysis techniques, this data 
reveals the ideational cleavage lines between actors or groups of actors within a 
media discourse fi eld particular to a given society (Leifeld and Haunss  2012 ). 
As such, this quantitative technique provides empirical data to the theoretical 
position stressing the importance of collective representations of (ideas describing) 
phenomena developed in Actor-Network Theory through qualitative research methods 
(Latour  2005 ). The discourse fi eld includes the ideas from scientifi c research that 
claim to accurately describe and predict natural phenomena as well as ideas welling 
up from less disciplined human processes that cloak such scientifi c claims in 
popular preferences and prejudices. This type of interaction has been deeply 
investigated in research on science and society (Jasanoff  2005 ). DNA allows the 
more precise identifi cation of different types of discourse and their degree of 
support by political actors. 
 The other type of SNA, termed the policy network method, is used to investigate 
the relationships between actors active in the climate change policy sphere. The policy 
network method grew out of the quantitative network analysis developed in the 
1960s and fi rst applied to small groups or communities. The policy network analysis 
(PNA) approach turned that technique to study the policy formation process as 
infl uenced by organizations, including agencies within the state and associations 
with society as an interactive polity. Researchers fi rst used PNA to examine American 
and German political processes during the 1970s (Laumann and Pappi  1976 ). 
They subsequently expanded the approach to compare Germany, the US and Japan 
(Knoke et al.  1996 ). As distinct from the newspaper discourse analyzed by DNA, 
the policy network survey gets responses about their ideas, resources and networks 
directly from representatives of the groups and organizations involved in the policy-
infl uence process. The survey data therefore allows for a precise examination of the 
discourse (policy stances, beliefs, ideologies) held by organizations as well as 
their coalition formation, political pursuits and degrees of infl uence. The use of a 
standardized basic network survey in multiple cases (nation-states or areas) allows 
for rigorous cross-case comparison and the search for common causal factors leading 
to emissions trajectories (from 1990 to present, in sum increasing, reducing, or level) 
(Broadbent  2010 ). 
10.3.1  Culture as Context in Social Network Analysis 
 When using SNA for comparative approaches (for instance in comparing different 
nations’ carbon policy outcomes), it is important to remember that social networks 
around discourse and action emerge from and operate within a  context . That is to 
say, neither actors, ideas or relationships are autonomous units. They differ in each 
situation, in this case in each nation-state policy network. In philosophical terms, 
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those “units” take shape within and help constitute unique social/cultural ontologies 
(ways of being). The components are formed and operate under basic social 
conditions (variously referred by different schools of social science as institutions, 
structures or systems) that constrain, facilitate and channel the possibilities of both 
discourse and action within a given society. This can be more broadly defi ned as a 
nation’s cultural framework. Existing cultural and social conditions constrain the 
emergence of new discourses and the possibilities of their application to create change. 
Depending on the nation in question, contextual factors can make the dynamics of 
either fi eld more or less solid and enduring or fl uid and volatile. The more fl uid the 
system, the more that actions interact with discourses to produce new forms of 
power and in the current concern, change societal practices and political policies 
affecting climate change mitigation. 
 Figure  10.1 presents a hypothetical model of that process within the national 
arena and between national and international levels (Broadbent  2010 ). Climate 
change as a geophysical process driven by human-caused carbon emissions enters 
the society as conceptual information. These concepts are processed through 
societal discourse and action and eventually “constructed” or rejected as usable 
knowledge by different advocacy groups. This “construction” process is profoundly 
infl uenced by local factors of the society itself, such as culture, institutions, level of 
economic development and others. The mixed effect eventuates in decisions or 
non- decisions with effects upon the carbon emissions trajectories of the society. 
These emissions in turn feed back into the global geophysical situation and its 
propensity to produce climate change and disastrous effects on societies. As societies 
 Fig. 10.1  Model  of social response to climate change 
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repeat these processes, they also build up through global negotiations a global climate 
regime – a set of ideas, norms and rules that may exert increasing infl uence upon 
the decision-making processes of member societies.
 Many studies have tried to attribute attitudes on the environment and on the 
science that explains the state of it to different demographic characteristics of 
populations. Research has shown that public perceptions of risk are widely divergent 
within different national populations (Siegrist et al.  2005 ). Different social groups 
in different nations have different issues of contention around different scientifi c 
claims (Walls et al.  2004 ). Thus, demographic characteristics such as age, race, or sex 
may be poor predictors of attitudes towards science, risk, or environmental values 
within cross-cultural comparison for an issue such as climate change. Rather, a 
person’s cultural framework serves as a better explanatory framework for how or 
why scientifi c knowledge (such as climate science) is valued or accepted (Jaeger 
et al.  1993 ). How successfully concepts of risk are understood (Slovic  1986 ) or 
scientific claims are communicated is largely a function of how science itself 
is framed within a given political and/or cultural environment (Jasanoff  1998 ). 
In cultures that employ a ‘science-centered’ paradigm, it is the duty of scientists to 
inform the ignorant state and to educate the irrational public as to what “real” risks 
are, and to provide advice on how to handle them (Tversky and Kahneman  1974 ). 
The robust environmental policies created around the globe between the 1960s and 
1980s were facilitated by cultures that embraced this ‘science-centered’ paradigm; 
in these democracies the public considered science as both credible and relevant 
(Gustafsson and Lidskog  2012 ). In a political culture that values public opinion, 
but where the ‘science-paradigm’ is not accepted, environmental concern – and 
therefore the science that underpins it – may be marginalized by a public whose 
primary concern is the economy. In this ‘economy-paradigm,’ perceptions of risk to 
the economy may outweigh the perception of risks of damage to the environment. 
 Brown Weiss and Jacobson ( 1998 ) observe that environmental concerns tend to 
be brushed aside if they pose a risk to the economy within societies that value 
participatory democracy and employ the ‘economy-paradigm.’ Indeed, it has been 
argued that democracies are ill-equipped to deal with ecological concerns, as the 
public tends to vote in their short-term self-interest (Giddens  2009 ). Shearman and 
Wayne Smith ( 2007 ) speculate that cultures that value both democracy and economic 
growth will continue to ignore the implications of climate science, even if actors 
within democracies accept that science as valid, because transient issues will out-
weigh such a permanent and entrenched issue within the electorate. This tendency 
to ignore, if not all out reject, scientifi c information that is deemed inconvenient for 
a society is termed ‘the triumph of short-termism’ (Clayton et al.  2006 ). Giddens 
( 2009 ) characterizes this tendency as ‘loss aversion,’ with the voting public more 
concerned about perceived losses than with future gains. 
 Cultures that tend to legitimize governance through majority rule, even when the 
majority may not be informed about an issue they are voting on, may have trouble 
cobbling together enough actors to form effective communication networks around 
climate change discourse or advocacy coalitions around climate change policy. 
This has opened up a transnational debate as to whether environmental regulation 
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should be based on the advice of experts or whether regulation should be legitimized 
through democratic consensus (Collins and Evans  2007 ; Renn  2008 ). By the 
time climate change became a prominent environmental issue during the 1990s, 
a coalition of actors had arisen within the United States that was both critical and 
hostile towards scientifi c reports on climate change (Hamilton  2007 ). Among the 
criticisms launched at the climate science community were that the models of climate 
change should aspire to scientifi c certainty for the prediction of hazards (Baker  2007 ), 
that scientists were attempting to usurp the role of the state’s authority (Jasanoff  1998 ), 
and scientifi c uncertainty around climate change had to be reduced before the 
climate science community could make policy recommendations (Brown  1992 ). 
All of these criticisms were criticisms that previous environmental issues had not 
had to contend with, or at least, not contend with to such an extreme. But because 
regulation based on science began to be framed as only legitimate through democratic 
consensus within American culture, a culture where scientifi c evidence could be 
contested because of democratic values became normative within the United States. 
 The issue of uncertainty has since emerged from American culture to become 
a rallying call to question all discourse around climate change and delay any man-
datory regulation of greenhouse gas emissions within the United States (IPCC 
 2007b ). The same tactics to create a culture of doubt around climate science have 
spread across the Pacifi c to democratic societies such as Australia and New 
Zealand (Hamilton  2007 ). The scientifi c community in many different democratic 
societies have been divided over how to respond to increased public scrutiny, with 
calls to reestablish a culture of communication between scientists and the public 
as authoritative rather than debatable (Collins and Evans  2007 ; Renn  2008 ), as 
well as a push to dialogue with the public over scientifi c knowledge (Jasanoff 
 2005 ; Lidskog  2008 ). 
 Thus, even if science is accepted within democracies, it may not be effective in 
setting policy objectives if the citizenry does not agree with the implications of 
science on regulation. This is not to suggest that cultures that value authoritative 
governance are uniquely equipped to deal with climate change; far from it. Indeed, 
authoritarian cultures have their own unique problems in addressing environmental 
concerns, including a lack of willingness to engage stakeholders and problems with 
adaptive management. Instead, the preceding examples are meant to illustrate to the 
reader the importance of context (both political and cultural) when examining both 
the discourse and action networks around climate change within a given society. 
10.3.2  Discourse Networks Around Climate Change 
 The fi eld of discourse represents the distribution of concepts (perceptions, beliefs, 
knowledge) and their meanings (interpretations, evaluations, frames, emotions) 
about prevalent in a society (Broadbent  2010 ). While resources and support are 
often traded between actors in a social network, so too are concepts and meanings, 
including an understanding of scientifi c principles. Engagement with science and an 
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understanding of scientifi c inquiry have become embedded as norms within a number 
of societies around the globe (Beck  2002 ; Höijer et al.  2006 ). Individuals engage in 
discourse over science not only through formal education, but also increasingly 
though informal means, such as the news media and interpersonal communication 
(Van Dijk  2011 ). Organizations too must engage discourse over science, though 
the manner in which scientifi c knowledge and methods of scientifi c inquiry are 
institutionalized and normalized within organizations is not well understood. 
Watson ( 2002 ) contends that organizational learning is poorly conceptualized, meaning 
a systematic investigation of how organizations process and gain knowledge has 
been diffi cult to implement. Compounding this defi cit in knowledge is the fact that 
the research that has begun to investigate how organizations learn has focused on the 
transmission of cultural, fi nancial, or legal knowledge rather than beliefs institution-
alized through gained scientifi c knowledge. 
 Communication networks are described by Hajer and Versteeg ( 2005 ) as 
discourse spaces where actors explain themselves in order to exert infl uence over 
other actors. Structural characteristics of discourse networks are important for 
understanding how effectively scientifi c knowledge is communicated between 
actors within a communication network. The density of a social network is the most 
widely used measure of group cohesion, with denser networks having more ties 
between actors (Blau  1977 ). Essentially, density quantifi es network “knittedness” 
within SNA (Bott  1957 ). Dense networks facilitate the dissemination of scientifi c 
information in a communication network by increasing the accessibility of informa-
tion in the network (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf  1997 ). In addition, networks 
with high density promote the development of universal norms in regards to natural 
resource management and environmental policy; they also promote compliance 
with these norms (Coleman  1990 ). 
 Because the geophysical and climatological processes involved in climate change 
are complex and require a specialized scientifi c background to understand them, 
non-specialists must rely heavily on scientists to frame and explain the problem. 
Scientists were relied upon to communicate risks on a number of environmental 
issues to a diverse network of actors during the latter half of the twentieth century. 
These issues included pesticide use, damage to the ozone layer and the impacts 
of radiation from nuclear weapons . However, faith in the scientifi c community 
has been heavily contested in regards to climate change. The framing of climate 
science as contentious rather than authoritative was facilitated by regulatory failures 
(Power  2007 ), an increasingly scientifi cally literate citizenry capable of questioning 
scientists (Nowotny et al.  2001 ), and a greater emphasis on individualization in a 
number of societies across the globe (Beck  1992 ). Scientifi c claims were no longer 
viewed as objective and scientists themselves were beginning to be viewed as 
untrustworthy. Climate scientists in particular began to be viewed as actors whose 
interests were in confl ict with the interests of the public, the business community, 
and the state (Gouldson et al.  2007 ). 
 When information about climate change moves through the discourse fi eld 
(contested or otherwise), evaluative norms come into play. Evaluative norms 
spread through discussion networks among organizations and individuals, as well as 
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through mass and specialized media (Broadbent  2010 ). The discourse network 
diagrams pictured below (Figs.  10.2 and  10.3 ) show the positions of organizations 
within New Zealand and the United States respectively on this issue (square) 
of climate science between 2007–2008. These diagrams were created using the 
software tool Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) (Leifeld  2011 ) where the size of 
each actor node (circles) represents the number of statements made about the issue 
within a sample of the nation’s news media.
 Within the New Zealand discourse network (Fig.  10.2 ) around the validity of 
climate science, the media portrayed a wide consensus on the domestic stage around 
the validity of climate change science. Organizational actors who accepted the 
evaluative norm that climate change was real and anthropogenic include Clark’s 
government ministries, most political parties (Labour, National, and United Future 
through statements to the press, Green, Māori, and New Zealand First through state-
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 Fig. 10.2  Discourse network on legitimacy of climate science within New Zealand press, 2007–2008 
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quoted by the press (Vaughter  2013 ). Organizational actors who rejected or 
questioned the evaluative norm that climate change was real included a variety of 
business lobbying groups, though no businesses themselves. The ACT Party is the 
only political party that refuted the validity of climate science, and the only research 
institute (the Heartland Institute) to refute it within the New Zealand press was from 
the United States. Within the New Zealand press, the discourse over the legitimacy 
of climate science is unquestioned by the government, and the majority of all 
research organizations and political parties. 
 Because the science supporting climate change appears well accepted by both 
the scientifi c community and political actors within the New Zealand press, the 
majority of debate about climate change covered by the press is not about operation-
alizing climate change as a problem, but rather on how to implement a solution. 
Clark’s Labour government and its constituent ministries, in coalition with the 
Green and New Zealand First Parties, comprise the majority of actors cited as 
pushing for a series of legislative solutions. This coalition of actors often stressed the 
‘science-paradigm’ for legitimizing their proposed actions through citing both 
the IPCC and NIWA data in setting the time frame for implementing these policies. 
The opposition National Party in coalition with the Māori Party, accepted the 
scientifi c fi ndings of the IPCC and NIWA as well and agreed climate change was an 
issue New Zealand needed to address. However, both parties viewed the Labour 
coalition’s time frame for implementing an economy-wide ETS as reactionary, 
 Fig. 10.3  Discourse network on legitimacy of climate science within United States Prestige Press, 
2007–2008 
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with negative repercussions for New Zealand’s economy and the autonomy of 
indigenous groups. These actors often employed the ‘economy-paradigm’ by citing 
economic data from the New Zealand Institute to illustrate the costs of implementing 
an economy wide ETS as quickly as the Labour coalition wanted. Within this 
group of actors, the ‘science-paradigm’ was accepted but discounted in favor of 
the ‘economy- paradigm.’ Businesses and environmental NGOs stayed out any 
discussion of climate science, and instead advocated for or against specifi c pieces 
of climate legislation. 
 The discourse networks about anthropogenic climate change in the US (Fig.  10.3 ) 
contrast distinctly with those of New Zealand. In this discourse network the legitimacy 
of climate science is contested rather than accepted by government actors such as 
the Bush Administration. In addition, while the majority of research organizations 
within the New Zealand discourse network are quoted as supporting the legitimacy 
of climate science, there is a more even split between positions within the research 
organizations cited in the American discourse network. This spit frames climate 
science as more controversial, with reporting on both perspectives being more 
“balanced,” despite little controversy within the climate science community itself 
(Boykoff and Boykoff  2004 ). 
 Actors within the American discourse network around climate change science 
appear much more divided in whether they accept or reject the ‘science-paradigm’ 
The cultural backdrop of the United States can also be glimpsed within this 
discourse network, with three fundamentalist religious groups weighing in on the 
issue, while religious groups are absent within the more secular New Zealand 
discourse network. 
 By portraying the climate debate as unsettled, the U.S. discourse network around 
climate change presents an inherent contradiction in its coverage of the issue. 
The debate over climate science occurs alongside discussions regarding the best 
ways to mitigate climate change. These two debates challenge each other’s legitimacy, 
the former implying that the latter is premature, and the latter assuming that the 
former has already been settled (Burridge et al.  2013 ). The further disagreement 
and contradiction between cited research organizations over climate change further 
fuels this fi re by failing to present a unifi ed or even majority viewpoint on the issue. 
As Boykoff and Boykoff ( 2004 ) note, this tendency for the media to represent support 
for and skepticism of climate science in roughly equal proportions is not represen-
tative of the positions held by the science community, which overwhelmingly 
accepts the science behind climate change. The overall effect of this contradiction 
in media coverage produces a diffuse and convoluted defi nition of the issue that 
fails to identify what element or elements of the problem are actually in question. 
And without a clear defi nition of the problem, neither the public nor their elected 
offi cials will be able to begin operationalizing solutions with any success. 
 While discourse around climate change within the US is prominent and contains 
a number of diverse organizational actors, the stances of the predominant actors in 
the debate are inconsistent in regards to discourse around climate change policy 
(Fig.  10.4 ). Decision makers appear to bend to whichever way their constituency 
blows, with little agreement within political parties as to how climate change should 
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be conceptualized, let alone handled. The reluctance of either political party to 
operationalize solutions to the problems presented by climate change is unsurprising, 
given the lack of agreement among decision makers as to what the problem  is . 
The Democratic and Republican parties both agree and disagree with a federal cap 
and trade mandate, at the same time the Republican Party is portrayed as both 
agreeing and disagreeing that climate change is a problem.
 Discourse networks can be used not only to probe actors’ normative stances, but 
can be employed to examine how information is disseminated within a society. 
Organizational actors learn through their networks as well as peer pressure about 
what evaluations (frames) to adopting regards to climate change. The dissemination 
of science, especially climate science, is never an easy task, because science itself is 
an iterative process, with an understanding of what is ‘objective reality’ changing 
and evolving over time. Some organizations can infl uence the fl ow of information to 
actors in a network, imposing frames of understanding upon them, or the diffusion 
can be interactive, through rational discussion among peers. In other instances, 
diffusion of knowledge may be blocked by certain actors within a network, or 
the implications of this knowledge may be discounted if they run counter to 
other concerns a given organization is facing. Actors using different normative 
standards will necessarily disagree about what to do. Only some actors will accept 
suffi cient responsibility to seriously think about, evaluate and act upon the issue 
(Broadbent  2010 ). 
 Fig. 10.4  Discourse network on federal cap and trade legislation in United States Prestige Press, 
2007–2008 
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 Tracing the fl ow of information and norms through networks will help indicate 
the function of organizations in a network. With optimal function, such forums may 
help the diffusion of scientifi c evidence and risk evaluation. For climate change, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has emerged as the predomi-
nant organization producing scientifi c information in relation to the topic. Thus, an 
examination of how information from the IPCC is disseminated from the organiza-
tion into the civil society of a given nation can help inform how the IPCC functions 
as an actor within that nation’s network of political actors. This in turn can illumi-
nate how knowledge about climate change is conveyed within a society, and how 
actors evaluate the risks associated with climate change and construct responses 
to these risks. In the network data analysis, if a diversity of organizations have 
information networks to such a forum, and also hold scientifi c and action-oriented 
norms, it will indicate that the forums do indeed have the predicted function. 
 The network image in Fig.  10.5 shows how information about climate change 
was disseminated to a large and diverse set of organizations in Japan during 1997. 
The organizations include a large number of government agencies (blue squares), 
and large number of business organizations (yellow double triangles), some political 
parties (the brown and red diamonds), two environmental NGOs (green circles) and 
 Fig. 10.5  Japanese organizational actors receiving information directly from the IPCC. 
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many media companies (white triangles). 1 The remaining brown triangle is Globe 
Japan, an international association of national politicians concerned about global 
environmental issues. The size of the icons refl ects their perceived level of infl uence 
in Japan’s domestic politics of global environmental issues (as determined by the 
number of respondents checking that organization as being “especially infl uential”). 
The communication network indicates that in the 1997 Japanese global environmental 
policy domain, the IPCC was among the big three infl uential organizations. Among 
the government ministries and agencies, the Air Quality Bureau of the Environmental 
Agency (AQ-EA) is second only to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI). The network image also reveals strong levels of perceived infl uence for 
the three news media clustered close to the government agencies. The Liberal 
Democratic Party is also assessed as highly infl uential, while the Japan Communist 
Party is diminutive. Business associations do not receive climate change information 
directly from the IPCC. Rather, businesses hand over this information- gathering 
task to a specialized business research institute, the Research Institute of the Electric 
Power Industry (CRIEPI), from which they probably get most of their information. 
Almost all of the domestic environmental NGOs do not receive information directly 
from the IPCC. Instead, the Japan branch of Greenpeace International serves as the 
primary information bridge-keeper to the domestic NGO community. This network 
fi gure indicates that in Japanese society the information bridge-keepers between 
outside and inside are relatively few, and those that perform this role have relatively 
high levels of political infl uence. This fi nding is in line with the network theory that 
being a bridge-keeper over a structural hole (a gap between clusters of organizations) 
gives power to the bridging actor (Burt  1992 ; Broadbent  2010 ).
 Upon examination of the Japanese communication network about climate science, 
Japanese society appears receptive to the logic of scientifi c evidence – indeed 
the culture is enamored of technology and very successful in its innovation – and 
relatively free of powerful belief systems that would militate against accepting such 
logic. Compared to US media, Japanese news media are closely dependent upon 
government ministries for information and have rarely presented views questioning 
the validity of the IPCC fi ndings and assertions. Japan’s climate change science 
establishment is closely tied to and funded by the government. It seems that Japanese 
climate scientists rarely act as autonomous knowledge brokers among different 
sectors or in the policy making process, nor do they directly address the public 
contrary to current government policy (unlike, for instance, top climate scientist 
James Hansen in the US) (Broadbent  2010 ). 
 As an extension of this research to the global level, a publication based on the 
Compon media content analysis analyzed the comparative response to the 2001 and 
2007 reports by the IPCC among fi ve Asian societies (Broadbent et al.  2013 ). 
This study found different intensity of coverage in China, India, Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan. However, the fact that Taiwan, not a UN member, always had the 
1
  Note: the color version of this fi gure is available online in the Open Access version of this book, 
the print version includes grey scale images. 
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lowest coverage indicated the importance of belonging to the UN system for 
receptivity to UN-based ideas. 
 Figure  10.6 shows how information about climate change was disseminated 
within New Zealand in 2008, in the lead up to the implementation of its economy- 
wide emission trading scheme. Organizations featured in this network include 
government ministries (blue circles), business organizations (red circles), political parties 
(orange circles), environmental NGOs (green circles), and research  organizations 
(purple circles). 2 
 As with the Japanese network in Fig.  10.4 , the size of the icon represents the level 
of perceived infl uence of the actor in disseminating knowledge about climate change. 
2
  Note: the color version of this fi gure is available online in the Open Access version of this book, 
the print version includes grey scale images. 
 Fig. 10.6  New Zealand organizational actors receiving scientifi c information about climate change. 
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As within Japan, the IPCC is one of the three most central actors within the network. 
Another highly centralized actor within the network is the National Institute of 
Weather and Atmosphere (NIWA) a state owned and operated Crown Research 
Institute responsible for much of the climatological data submitted by New Zealand 
to the IPCC. The Ministry for the Environment (MEnvi) is the actor responsible for 
the majority of dissemination of scientifi c information on climate change to other 
actors, having the greatest centrality score of any of the actors within the network. 
The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (MFA&T) also fi gure prominently in the communication network, as well 
as several other Crown Research Institutes and domestic research universities. 
None of the political parties are presented as especially critical to information 
transfer, though the majority of political parties do appear within the network. 
Like in the Japanese case, businesses (yellow circles) tend to receive most of their 
information from business lobbying groups (red circles ). While most of the domestic 
environmental NGOs do receive information from both the IPCC and NIWA, they 
do not in turn seem to give information about climate change to many actors within 
the network. This network fi gure indicates that within New Zealand the organizations 
conducting research on climate change themselves as well as the Ministry of the 
Environment act as bridge-keepers between actors within society, suggesting a high 
level of political infl uence. 
 In examining the New Zealand communication network around climate science, 
New Zealand also appears receptive to scientifi c evidence produced by the IPCC 
and its constituent organizations, many of which appear as Crown Research 
Institutes within this network. While the New Zealand media does present views 
questioning the validity of the IPCC’s fi ndings and assertions, the actors cited as 
doing so are not often research organizations as in the American media. While 
New Zealand climate change science organizations do not act exclusively as 
knowledge brokers among diverse clusters of actors, the do play an important role 
of being the sources of scientifi c information for those actors that do act as knowl-
edge brokers. 
10.3.3  Policy Networks Around Climate Change 
 The fi eld of action represents the behavior of actors – individuals, organizations, 
states – as they interact to promote or oppose change, often though policy. 
National policies interact with and help or hinder the formation of global regimes 
(Broadbent  2010 ). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s ( 1993 ) concept of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF) uses network structures in order to investigate action 
through policy processes. One of the original goals of the ACF was to investigate how 
actors mobilized within advocacy coalitions around scientifi c information to inform 
environmental policy (Weible et al.  2011 ). In order to do this, actors must identify 
allies with common objectives they are willing and able to enter into coalition with 
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(Weible and Sabatier  2005 ). The prevailing evidence indicates that actors with similar 
beliefs about the implications of scientifi c knowledge tend to coordinate with each 
other on actions (Zafonte and Sabatier  1998 ). However, recent research by Baldassarri 
and Diani ( 2007 ) has shown that support networks connect diverse clusters of 
organizations with common general beliefs but distinct organizational identities 
and priorities. Di Gregorio ( 2012 ) terms this process ‘macro-integration’ – where 
robust support networks are formed by organizations which do not necessarily 
have collective identity or set of values but their distinct identities and value sets are 
compatible enough to form a coalition. In this instance, action is most effective 
when actors with a common purpose but diverse identities network. 
 The study of advocacy coalitions has traditionally framed coalition building and 
function within the context of political contention. In this case, advocacy coalitions 
fi t within the fi eld of action. The theory of the Treadmill of Production (Schnaiberg 
et al.  2003 ) contends that measures to protect the environment will be met with 
severe opposition from industrial and exploitative actors within society. In this 
scheme, the only way to bring about change to the environmentally destructive 
status quo is through massive social mobilization. This social mobilization can 
manifest itself through demonstrations, boycotts, electoral victories, the passing of 
regulatory legislation, or some combination of all of the above. However, advocacy 
coalitions can also be framed as instruments of infl uence and instruction. In this 
case, advocacy coalitions fi t within the fi eld of discourse. The theory of Ecological 
Modernization (Janicke  2002 ; Mol and Sonnenfeld  2000 ) maintains that protections 
to the environment can be brought about through more passive means. In this instance, 
behaviors that protect ecosystems are brought about through the dissemination of 
norms, the diffusion of new ideas, and a non-politicized learning process (Broadbent 
 2010 ). Here, advocacy coalitions bring about change through consensus rather 
than through contention. In the following sections, we will be examining advocacy 
coalitions within the framework of the action fi eld. 
 The implication of social network analysis (SNA) around environmental 
advocacy coalitions is an increased understanding of what features of social networks 
are necessary precursors for successful advocacy around environmental policy in 
general, and climate change policy in particular (Bodin et al.  2006 ; Crona and 
Bodin  2006 ). Tompkins and Adger ( 2004 ) put forward that social networks with 
more ties between stakeholders and regulatory actors builds resilience and adaptive 
capacity to environmental change in societies. However, there has been little 
research into the relation between network structure and specifi c policy outcomes. 
Additionally, while social movements are well studied within the social sciences, 
advocacy coalitions are less so. It can be diffi cult to tease apart the differences 
between an advocacy coalition and a social movement, but there is a growing need 
to within the literature, as advocacy coalitions continue to engage an increasingly 
diverse set of stakeholders around issues as complex as climate change. 
 In order to change behavior at a social level, the initial bearers of claims and 
norms must expand networks: persuade an increasing circle of adherents until their 
number and activity reaches a critical mass (Broadbent  2010 ). In this process, 
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knowledge must be operationalized and social learning must turn into social 
mobilization. In order to effect change in response to the knowledge they are 
claiming as legitimate, advocacy coalitions need to garner enough political support 
to enable them to pass and enforce regulations and laws that demand and enforce 
certain environmental standards. These policies can become manifest through legis-
lation such as an emissions trading scheme (cap and trade law) or some other form 
of emissions regulation (i.e., a carbon tax). In order to do this, advocacy coalitions 
must form connections with a larger and more diverse set of actors within a society 
to achieve this critical mass. When a mobilized advocacy coalition garners enough 
support to form a majority government, or gains enough support to push a govern-
ment on a particular piece of policy, it begins to exert power within the state, through 
the legislative and policy-making process. From that vantage point, the new regime 
can establish the legal and policy conditions to bring about society-wide change in 
behavioral norms (by education, persuasion, inducement, regulation, new institu-
tions and other means) (Broadbent  2010 ). 
 The political strength of advocacy coalitions in taking action to push for climate 
change legislation appears to vary depending on the cultural milieu of the society in 
question. In Sweden, where social corporatism is the norm within the political culture, 
there is a diverse representation of actors within the advocacy coalitions centered 
around climate change legislation. This included incorporation of a large number of 
environmental NGOs within the Swedish policy sphere. Within the US, the political 
culture is one of pluralism. Ironically, this leads actors to compete with one another 
for dominance within the policy sphere, with the wealthier business entities (often 
opposed to climate change legislation) exerting more infl uence. This can lead to 
more environmental NGOs being left outside the political process. 
 Organizational actors who work in tandem within an advocacy coalition on the 
political stage are central players within the study of social networks. Such networks 
often build upon longer existing relationships, such as the long-term exchange of 
mutual aid (reciprocity). These networks suffuse societies in different densities 
and patterns, helping give rise to different policy making processes. For instance, 
the reciprocity network penetrates the full Japanese fi eld of labor politics very 
thoroughly, but in the US is only present among labor unions (Broadbent  2001 ,  2008 ). 
In the Japanese case, the presence of reciprocity networks increased the likelihood 
that the so-connected actors would transfer political support. 
 Broadbent ( 2005 ) notes that in Japan’s action phase, advocacy coalitions have 
played a weak role in infl uencing national climate change policy. Frames concerning 
national prosperity and energy suffi ciency formulated by the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry have dominated debates about climate change, rather than fears 
about the future disasters that climate change will bring such as presented by the 
Environment Ministry. The close alliance between the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party and the corporatistic business sector led by the JFEO (Japan Federation of 
Economic Organizations or  Keidanren ) have further buttressed a weak political 
posture toward climate change insisting on voluntary action by business and no 
carbon tax on consumption rather than the imposition of regulations by government. 
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 On the other hand, in New Zealand advocacy coalitions have played a vital role 
in passing domestic climate change legislation. In terms of scope, coverage, and 
speed of implementation, New Zealand’s national emissions trading scheme (ETS) 
is arguably one of the world’s most ambitious climate policies. Passed by the out- 
going Labour government in late 2008, the ETS covers all six greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) listed within the Kyoto Protocol. The current incarnations of the European 
Union’s ETS, as well as the Swiss and Norwegian ETS, cover only the emissions of 
carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). By regulating methane (CH 4 ) and nitrous oxide (N 2 O) under 
the scheme, New Zealand opened up sectors of economic activity to emissions regu-
lation, such as agriculture, forestry, and land use change, which had typically been 
ignored in Europe (Moyes  2008 ). What is remarkable about this is that New Zealand 
is by and large an agricultural export economy, unique within Annex I nations, with 
a large share of its greenhouse gas emissions coming from agriculture and forestry. 
The average proportion of GHG emissions from post-industrial nations are 83.2 % 
CO 2 , 9.5 % CH 4 , and 5.9 % N 2 O (UNFCCC  2007 ). At the time the ETS was drafted, 
New Zealand’s GHG emissions were 46.5 % CO 2 , 35.2 % CH 4 , and 17.2 % N 2 O, 
with HFCs, PFCs, and SF 6 together accounting for the remaining 1.1 % of total 
GHG emissions (Ministry for the Environment  2007 ). 
 While New Zealand’s policy instrument of choice for dealing with climate change 
generated substantial debate within both parliament and the press, a large proportion 
of organizational actors within New Zealand society accepted the frame that climate 
change was a long-term threat to the nation and that a policy approach was an appro-
priate response. A number of the ministries within the Labour government, three of 
the nation’s major political parties, that nation’s alternative energy companies, the 
airline industry, and a slew of businesses and environmental NGOs supported the 
creation of a comprehensive ETS. A coalition of agricultural and industrial business 
lobbying groups, and two of the nation’s smaller political parties opposed the pas-
sage of the ETS. The opposition National Party conditionally supported the ETS, but 
later took up opposition against it as they objected to the speed at which it would be 
implemented across all sectors of the economy. Despite losing support from the 
National Party at the last minute, the Labour Government was able to cobble together 
support for climate change legislation that it was able to pass the ETS in 2008. 
 The social networks in focus here are advocacy coalitions which mobilized either 
for or against the ETS within New Zealand civil society in the lead up to the nation’s 
Kyoto commitment period. The advocacy coalition around creating a domestic 
emissions trading scheme within New Zealand is characterized by a high degree of 
connectivity between actors within the network. Clark’s Labour Government created 
the cabinet position of Minister of Climate Change and this actor holds a high degree 
of centrality within the network along with Ministry for the Environment and the 
Labour Party itself. While modularity is observable within the network (especially 
around the cluster of environmental NGOs), the degree of betweenness among all of 
the actors is relatively low, suggesting the network is relatively robust. Because the 
network is characterized by high measures of connectivity and low levels of 
betweenness, the centrally located Labour government actors were able to assert 
control within the network and direct the form carbon regulation would take. 
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10.4  Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued for the utility of Social Network Analysis for the 
inter- disciplinary investigation of climate change as a social issue and problem. 
SNA can integrate the effects of ideas from the social and natural sciences and the 
humanities upon the fi elds of discourse and action around climate change. 
Examining the structure and fl ow of different kinds of social networks around 
climate change reveals patterns of understanding and action that shape the social 
response to climate change and other problems. Examining both discourse networks 
and advocacy coalitions, the chapter has developed an initial comparison of differ-
ences in how three societies, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States, have been 
framing and responding to climate change, The chapter, drawing upon early results 
from the project Comparing Climate Change Policy Networks (Compon), illustrates 
the great potential of the network approach for the inter-disciplinary study of climate 
change and society cross-nationally. 
 Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited
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